помогите уловить смысл задания
перевожу но не пойму что требуется
IV. In what connections are mentioned the following terms
divisional specific information
optimal operative network
issue of cost and revenue allocation
a core of network game
conditions on the network situation
В связи с чем употребляются термины
ну я так же и перевела,только как тут отвечать?вот текст
This text analyzes an allocation problem associated to maintaining a communication network between various economic agents. Communication links are widely observed in reality and our framework applies to many such situations like telecommunication, utilities, computer networks and information technology.
The latter application is particularly interesting as firms increasingly invest in information technology equipment to improve firm-wide availability of divisional-specific (or lower-level) information. In principle the model assumes that all links within the underlying communication network are publicly available
apart from possible exogenously determined restrictions.
The use of a link however is assumed to be costly: a fixed cost is imposed on each link independent that exactly is using this particular link to establish communication. Next to these communication costs there are also revenues from communication. These revenues are assumed to be bilateral, i.e., the actual revenues of a group of agents is determined as the sum of the revenues of the pairs of those agents within this group who can directly or indirectly communicate via a sequence of communication links whose costs are accounted for by the group as a whole. If a group of agents chooses a particular sub-network to be operative by paying the corresponding communication costs, this implicitly determines the total benefits from communication within this group. So the problem the agents face is to find an optimal operative network, i.e., an operative network with highest possible net benefits. Moreover, next to this optimization problem the agents also face an allocation problem: how to divide the net benefits of an optimal operative network among the agents?
Our setting constitutes a typical example in which the fundamental economic issue of cost and revenue allocation resulting from a cooperative endeavor takes place in the context of discrete optimization on networks. The analysis will incorporate and intermingle techniques from optimization and cooperative game theory. Related literature with respect to restricted cooperation possibilities based on exogenous communication graphs we refer to is Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001). Closely related within this stream of research is a research (Slikker and van den Nouweland, 2000) on network formation with costs for establishing links. There, however, the costs per link are assumed to be identical and the focus is not on a bilaterally based revenue structure. In our framework this means that the optimization problem with respect to finding the optimal operative communication network is relatively easy to solve. In the same spirit as this paper on determining optimal operative networks and allocating the corresponding net benefits are on minimum cost spanning tree problems and games. In our setting, however, the focus is not solely on costs but to find in some sense an optimal compromise between maximizing joint revenues and minimizing joint costs.
The research paper incorporates two main results. The first result is that the core of a network game, i.e. a cooperative game in coalitional form in which the value of a coalition equals the maximal net benefits of communication, is non-empty. This implies that a core allocation exists and that such an allocation induces stable cooperation in the sense that no subgroup can improve their individual payoffs by establishing a communication network on their own.
The proof of this result nicely combines the OR-techniques of relaxation and duality with a game theoretic technique of constructing core elements within the context of linear production situations with committee control.
The second result provides sufficient conditions on the network situation such that the corresponding network game is convex. The proof involves relations between optimal networks of various coalitions. The interest in convexity is motivated by the nice properties these games possess. For example, for convex games the core is equal to the convex hull of all marginal vectors, and, value is the centre of the core. Moreover, the bargaining set and the core coincide, and the kernel coincides with the nucleolus. The proof is obtained by establishing relation between optimal networks of various coalitions.
Найдите предложения с этими сочетаниями и переведите, но это имо.